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III. JURISDICTION
A "Petition for Emergency Relief or in the Alternative Leave to File a
Discretionary Appeal" was filed with the Utah Supreme Court on September 24,
2007, pursuant to Rules 5 and 8A of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and
Utah Code Annotated Sections 78-2-2(3)0). On September 26, 2007, pursuant to
authority granted by Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2-2(4), the Supreme Court
transferred the case to this Court. On October 15,2007, this Court granted Petition
for leave to file an interlocutory appeal.
IV. ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

On April 2, 2004, prior to Karl Heinz Schwemmer's (the "Decedent")

death, he caused the J Street House to be deeded to his brother, the Appellee, Fred
A. Schwemmer ("Fred").1
2.

The Decedent also left the J Street House to Fred in his Will.2

3.

Fred has been physically and financially maintaining the property since

Fred's death.3

1

"Memorandum in Support of Applicant Fred Schwemmer's Motion for
Summary Judgment" Record on Appeal ("R.") 154-173 at p. 157 (Appellee's
Addendum 3); "Affidavit of Fred Schwemmer." R. 244-1246 at p. 1244-45,1f2.
(Appellee's Addendum 4)
2

"Will of Karl Heinz Schwemmer." R. 20-25 at p. 21, 1J4 (Appellant's
Addendum D).
3

Appellee's Addendum 4, R. 1244-1246 at p. 1245, ffl[4-5.

1

4.

In connection with her contest of the Decedent's Will, Rosalinde

Schwemmer encumbered the title to the J Street House by filing a Lis Pendens
against it.4
5.

Rosalinde Schwemmer has resisted Fred's efforts to sell the J Street

House and escrow the proceeds of the sale to alleviate his burden.5
6.

Trial in this matter was set for August 22, 2007.6

7.

Appellant's counsel, formerly counsel for Rosalinde Schwemmer,

moved for a Continuance of the Trial.7
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a) requires the appointment of a

substitute party when the death of a party occurs and a motion is filed and notice
given.

While the personal representative of an estate is a proper party for

substitution, a Special Representative may also be a proper party. It would be in
contravention of the purpose of Rule 25, which is to prevent undue delay, for Fred
to have to wait in this probate proceeding for the appointment of a personal
representative in Rosalinde Schwemmer's Estate (Probate No. 063901761) (herein
4

"Notice of Pending Litigation (Lis Pendens)" R. 506-507 (Appellee's
Addendum 3).
5

"Widow's Objection to the Motion for Authority to Sell Property." R. 520521 (Appellee's Addendum 4); "Memorandum in Support of the Objection to the
Motion to Sell Property" R. 522-528 (Appellee's Addendum 5).
6

"Motion for Continuance of Trial." R. 1181 at p. 1181, lines 2-3. (Appellant's
Addendum G).
7

Id.
2

"Rosalinda Schwemmer's Estate"). Rather, Suzette Ruseler ("Suzette"), who is
clearly interested in this matter, should be directed to take action to become the
Special Representative of Rosalinde Schwemmer's Estate.
B.

Suzette did not preserve her Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a)

argument, and therefore, it is waived.
C.

If Suzette's Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a) argument was

preserved, then the rule requires that ratification of commencement of the action or
joinder or substitution of the real party interest be made within a reasonable time or
Rosalinde Schwemmer's action should be dismissed.
D.

Suzette should be precluded from review by this Court because her

counsel invited the error about which she now complains.
VI. ARGUMENT
A. Naming Suzette as the Substitute Party is Harmless Error, If Any
It is undisputed that the lower court correctly granted F:red's Motion for
Substitution of Parties. Appellant's Brief at p. 20. Suzette simply objects to being
named as the substituted party. Both parties agree that Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
25(a)(1) is controlling in this instance. The particular provision of Rule 25(a)(1)
provides in pertinent part: "If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished,
the court may order substitution of the proper parties." Utah R. Civ. P. 25(a)(1).
With respect to determining who should be named as a substitute party, Stoddard
v. Smith provides: "[ojnce the motion is made, the proper person to be substituted
for the decedent may be ascertained in due course, by discovery if necessary."
3

Stoddard v. Smith. 2001 UT 47,1J19, 27 P.3d 546, 551. Therefore, the lower court
could have directed that discovery be undertaken to determine who should be
named as the substitute party. But what discovery would realistically be necessary
to determine the proper party in this action? The heirs to Rosalinde Schwemmer's
Estate are known.

Appellant's Addendum H, R. 1206 at 1f3.

The personal

representative appointed in Rosalinde Schwemmer's Will is known. Appellant's
Addendum G, R. 1182 at 1J4. The contestant to Rosalinde Schwemmer's Will is
known. Appellant's Addendum G at R. 1182-1183, ffl| 5,10(A). Suzette argues that
the only proper party to be appointed pursuant to Rule 25 would be the personal
representative for Rosalinde Schwemmer's Estate. A personal representative has
still not been formally named in Rosalinde Schwemmer's Estate.

Appellant's

Addendum G, R. 1181 atlJA; Appellant's Brief at p. 7. The appointment remains a
hotly contested issue in that matter. Appellant's Addendum J at R. 1364, p. 4, lines
7-12. Nevertheless, a procedure is readily available under Utah Code Ann. Section
75-3-614 (1993) which provides for the appointment of a Special Administrator.
Pursuant to that procedure, when appointing a Special Administrator the court is to
"prefer the appointment of the person named personal representative in the
decedent's last will if available and qualified." Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-615(1) (1993).
The individual named as the personal representative in Mrs. Schwemmer's Will is
Richard Ruseler ("Richard"). Appellant's Addendum J, R. 1364, p. 4, lines 7-12.
Does that mean that Suzette cannot be a proper party as she argues? No. Suzette,
through her counsel, made it clear on the record in the lower court that Richard and
4

Suzette are basically one in the same as a husband and wife team. Appellant's
Addendum J, R. 1364, p. 21, lines 17-18. Moreover, Suzette is the sole beneficiary
under Rosalinde Schwemmer's Will and in the alternative an heir in intestacy, so she
is clearly an interested party. Appellant's Brief at p. 6. Therefore, error, if any, by
the lower court was harmless.
To permit discovery to be had or to wait for the hotly contested appointment
of a personal representative in Rosalinde Schwemmer's Estate would merely cause
more delay in contravention of the purpose of Rule 25, which "is to prevent undue
delay in a lawsuit." Stoddard. 2001 UT 47, U 10, 27 P.3d 546, 549. Rosalinde
Schwemmer died more than fifteen months ago on October 25, 2006. Appellant's
Addendum H, R. 1205. The petition to admit Ms. Schwemmer's Will to probate and
the petition to find the Will invalid were filed over a year ago in January, 2007.
Appellant's Addendum J, R. 1364 at p. 12, lines 6-11.

Still no personal

representative has been named for Rosalinde Schwemmer's Estate. Appellant's
Brief at p. 7. Suzette agreed, in the proceedings before Judge Toomey, that Fred
is prejudiced by the delay occurring in this case. Appellant's Addendum J, R. 1364
at p. 11, lines 3-4 ("I don't disagree with Counsel that his client's [sic] prejudiced").
Therefore, this Court should alleviate the prejudice against Fred and direct Suzette
to move for the appointment of a Special Administrator in Rosalinde Schwemmer's
Estate pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 75-3-614 (1993). Whether she is
appointed or her husband is appointed should be of no consequence since they are
one in the same. Appellant's Addendum J, R. 1364 at p. 21, lines 17-18. The
5

Special Representative would be entitled to reimbursement for expenses incurred
for actions undertaken to preserve the estate. In re Jones' Estate. 59 Utah 99, 202
P. 206, 208 (Utah 1921). Therefore, Suzette could avoid the prejudice that she
fears, specifically the cost of preserving the estate. In order to further this action as
intended by Rule 25, the Court should direct Suzette to move to be officially
appointed as a Special Representative.
B. Suzette's Rule 17(a) Argument was Not Preserved for Appeal
Suzette did not preserve for appeal her argument under Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 17(a) (real party in interest) as a ground to overturn the lower court's
appointment of Suzette as the substitute party. A review of the hearing before Judge
Toomey (Appellant's Addendum J8) confirms that Suzette did not raise this issue in
the lower court. Suzette has, therefore, waived the argument and should be barred
from raising it now. The Utah appellate courts have established that '"in order to
preserve an issue for appeal the issue must be presented to the trial court in such
a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue.'" Pratt v. Nelson.
2007 UT 41, 1J15,164 P.3d 366, 372-73. The Utah Supreme Court has established
three factors to determine whether the trial court had an opportunity to rule. Those
factors are: "'"(1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue must be
specifically raised; and (3) a party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant
legal theory."'" \± Suzette did not raise Rule (17a) as an issue in the lower court at

8

Suzette did not file any memoranda in opposition to Applicant Fred
Schwemmer's Motion for Substitution of Parties.
6

any time and so the lower court did not have an opportunity to rule on its
applicability. Therefore, Suzette has failed to preserve this issue on appeal.
C. If Preserved, Rule 17(a) Requires Action Within a Reasonable Time
Even if Suzette has not waived her Rule 17(a) argument, the reasonable time
requirement of Rule 17(a) lends credence to the lower court's action. The particular
provisions of Rule 17(a) at issue are:
Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest.... No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not
prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable
time has been allowed after objection for ratification of commencement
of the action by or joinder or substitution of the real party in interest....
Utah R. Civ. P. 17(a). What constitutes a reasonable time under Rule 17(a) has not
been established by our courts. However, it has been more than fifteen (15) months
since Rosalinde Schwemmer's death and no action has been taken on the part of
the potential personal representatives or heirs to continue this action on behalf of
Rosalinde's Estate. Time is most important when dealing with real property as we
are here. The conduct of Suzette in seeking to avoid appointment as a Special
Administrator and arguing she is not a proper party results in nothing but undue
delay and prejudice to Fred. Therefore, again, the Court should direct Suzette to
move for the appointment of a Special Representative forthwith or suffer the
consequence of dismissal under Rule 17(a).

7

D. Suzette's Counsel Invited the Error, If Any
The Court is also free to deny Suzette any relief as her counsel invited the
error about which she now complains. The invited error doctrine "arises from the
principle that a party cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial when that
party led the trial court into committing an error." Pratt. 2007 UT 41, 1J17,164 P.3d
at 373. The invited error doctrine typically requires an affirmative representation to
the court. \± at 1|18. The exchange with the lower court regarding the appointment
of Richard and/or Suzette was as follows:
THE COURT: But if he [Richard] loses, she's [Suzette] still a
potential heir in that case.
MR. MCPHIE: She is a -then she's still a potential heir, because
she's still a blood relative and would get under - receive under the
(inaudible) THE COURT: Right, but in that case, why not name both of
them?
MR. MCPHIE: Or just her. It makes little difference. They're a
husband/wife team obviously.
THE COURT: Right.
MR. POOLE: I think it would be more appropriate to name her,
frankly.
MR. MCPHIE: It doesn't really matter too much.
THE COURT: Okay, then let's do it with her.
MR. MCPHIE: Okay.
Appellant's Addendum J, R. 1364 at p. 21, lines 10-24. Suzette's counsel therefore
admitted that it does not make any difference whether Suzette or Richard is named
as the substitute party. He acquiesced in the appointment of Suzette and therefore
Suzette should not be permitted appellate review of her claim by this Court.

8

VII. CONCLUSION
The contest of the Decedent's Will has been pending for more than three
years. The Decedent's Will directed that the J Street House be given to his brother,
Fred. Prior to his death, the Decedent also quit-claimed the J Street House to Fred.
Despite the fact that Fred obtained title to the house in April, 2004, Rosalinde
Schwemmer encumbered the title to the J Street House by filing a Lis Pendens
against it and also filed a quiet title action which has been dismissed. Fred's hands
have, therefore, been tied with respect to the J Street House for more than three
years. Rosalinde Schwemmer refused to help alleviate Fred's burden of maintaining
the J Street House by permitting him to sell the J Street House and escrow the
funds.
Rosalinde Schwemmer died more than fifteen months ago. Since that time,
no action has been taken by the personal representative named in her Will or any
of her potential beneficiaries or heirs to be named as a substitute party in this action.
Fred finally took it upon himself to have some action taken by filing a Motion to
Substitute Parties. Suzette and her husband made a special appearance at the
hearing to name a substitute party. Their counsel, while first objecting, acquiesced
in the appointment of Suzette as a substitute party. Suzette now complains that she
should not have been appointed. And once again, Fred, the legal title holder to the
J Street House in dispute under the Will, is left with his hands tied.
Nevertheless, despite Suzette's contentions that the only proper party under
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 25 is the Personal Representative of Rosalinde
9

Schwemmer's Estate, she has failed to seek appointment as a Special
Representative of the estate who may also be a proper party. In order to alleviate
additional undue delay to be suffered by Fred, which Suzette admits is causing
prejudice to Fred, the Court should require Suzette to file a motion to be named as
the Special Representative in Rosalinde Schwemmer's Estate, thereby correcting
any harmless error that may have occurred. This action would not only protect Fred,
but Suzette as well.
Suzette also seeks to have her appointment overturned pursuant to Utah Rule
of Civil Procedure 17(a). However, Suzette did not preserve this issue for appeal.
Even if she did preserve the issue, Rule 17(a) requires action to have a proper party
named within a reasonable time. Again, it has been more than fifteen months since
Rosalinde Schwemmer died and no action has been taken by anyone on behalf of
her estate to be substituted as a party. While a reasonable period of time has not
been defined by the law, the delay of more than fifteen months, which Suzette
admits is prejudicing Fred, is unreasonable. Action must be taken or this Court
should direct the lower court to dismiss Rosalinde Schwemmer's action.
DATED this / ^ a y of February, 2008.

, /^yC<jfZ
~2_
DENNIS K. POOLE
ELIZABETH M. EVANS
POOLE & ASSOCIATES, L.C.
Attorneys for Appellee
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ADDENDUM 1

75-3-614. Special administrator — Appointment.
(1) A special administrator may be appointed:
(a) Informally by the registrar on the application of any interested person when necessary to protect
the estate of a decedent prior to the appointment of a general personal representative or if a prior
appointment has been terminated as provided in Section 75-3-609;
(b) In a formal proceeding by order of the court on the petition of any interested person and finding,
after notice and hearing, that appointment is necessary to preserve the estate or to secure its proper
administration including its administration in circumstances where a general personal representative
cannot or should not act. If it appears to the court that an emergency exists, appointment may be ordered
without notice.
Enacted by Chapter 150, 1975 General Session

ADDENDUM 2

75-3-615. Appointment of special administrators.
(1) If a special administrator is to be appointed pending the probate of a will which is the subject of a
pending application or petition for probate, the court shall prefer the appointment of the person named
personal representative in the decedent's last will if available and qualified. In appropriate cases, the
court may limit the powers given to the special administrator, it may appoint someone else to be special
administrator, or it may otherwise act to protect the estate and interested persons.
(2) In other cases, any proper person may be appointed special administrator.
Amended by Chapter 179, 1992 General Session

ADDENDUM 3

DENNIS K. POOLE
(2625)
ELIZABETH EVANS
(7256)
POOLE & ASSOCIATES, L.C.
Attorneys for Applicant
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801)263-3344
Telecopier: (801)263-1010

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, PROBATE DIVISION

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE
OF:
KARL HEINZ SCHWEMMER
DOB: June 9, 1928
Deceased.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
APPLICANT FRED SCHWEMMER'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
PROBATE NO. 043902075
JUDGE LESLIE LEWIS

I. Introduction
Applicant Fred A. Schwemmer ("Applicant") seeks dismissal of Rosalinde
Schwemmer's ("Contestant") Objection to the Application for Informal Probate of a Will and
for Appointment of a Personal Representative. Contestant opposes the probate of Karl
Heinz Schwemmer's ("Decedent") Last Will and Testatment on the grounds that. 1)
Decedent was incompetent to make a Will; 2) Decedent was coerced and under duress
at the time of making his Will; and 3) Decedent was incompetent and was coerced and
under duress when he transferred property to Applicant. Contestant cannot meet her
E \Liz\Schwemmer\Summary Judgment Memo wpd

burden of proof to establish any of the foregoing, and therefore, summary judgment should
be granted in favor of Applicant.
Prior to the Decedent's death, he owned two homes in Salt Lake County, Utah. The
first is located at 2458 East 2900 South, Salt Lake City, Utah (the "2900 South House").
The second is located at 425 J Street in Salt Lake City, Utah (the "J Street House").
Months prior to the Decedent's death, he became estranged from his wife, the Contestant.
He moved out of his marital home and into the J Street House to live alone. The Decedent
then contacted his brother, the Applicant, to help him with his personal care and with the
maintenance of the J Street House. In exchange for the help, the Decedent promised to
give the Applicant the J Street House. The dispute in this matter involves the Decedent's
inter vivos transfer of the J Street House to the Applicant, and despite his complaining at
one point in time regarding the transfer, his subsequent ratification of the transfer by
devising the J Street House to the Applicant in his Will. Further, the Contestant objects to
the Decedent's appointment of Applicant as the Personal Representative of his estate.
II. Statement of Undisputed Facts
1.

Dr. Daniel Davis, M.D. served as the Decedent's primary care physician

beginning in 1995 through the date of Decedent's death. Deposition of Daniel Davis, dated
May 5, 2005 (Davis Dep.), at p. 6, lines 7-12 (Cited pages and exhibits are attached as
Exhibit 1 to the Affidavit of Elizabeth Evans, dated January 3, 2006 ("Evans Aff.")).

E \Liz\Schwemmer\Summary Judgment Memo wpd
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2.

Dr. Davis testified that the Decedent suffered two strokes while under his

care. One on July 4, 1998 and the other on August 4, 1999. Davis Dep. at p. 7, lines 1-20
and Exhibits 1 and 2 thereto.
3.

Dr. Davis testified that the Decedent did not suffer any mental impairment as

a result of the strokes. Davis. Dep. p. 8, lines 3-7.
4.

Dr. Davis examined the Decedent from October 21,2003 through July, 2004,

and did not find that the Decedent had any mental impairments on any of his visits. Davis
Dep. pp. 9-31, and Exhibits 3-6 thereto.
5.

Further, Dr. Davis testified that there was never any indication that the

Decedent suffered from any symptoms of Alzheimer's Disease or that he had any
problems with his short-term memory. Davis Dep. at p. 33, lines 15-25, p. 36, lines 5-16.
6.

Decedent owned two homes located in Salt Lake County, Utah. The first is

located at 2458 East 2900 South, Salt Lake City, Utah (the "2900 South House"). The
second is located at 425 J Street in Salt Lake City, Utah (the "J Street House").
7.

In 1999, the Decedent sold the J Street House to Gregg Sanderson

("Sanderson").

Deposition of Gregg Sanderson, dated March 30, 2005 ("Sanderson

Dep."), p. 4, lines 6-21 (Cited pages and exhibits are attached as Exhibit 2 Evans Aff.).
8.

In the Spring, of 2003, the Decedent purchased the J Street House back from

Sanderson. Sanderson Dep. p. 7, lines 18-21, p. 10, lines 7-9, pp. 11-12, lines 12-25, lines
1-4.

E \Uz\Schwemmer\Summary Judgment Memo wpd
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9.

Applicant is the brother of the Decedent. Deposition of Fred Schwemmer,

dated December 12, 2005 ("Applicant Dep."), p. 4, lines 10-12 (Cited pages and exhibits
are attached as Exhibit 3 Evans Aff.). .
10.

Applicant testified that in March, 2004, the Decedent promised Applicant that

if Applicant took care of Decedent and the J Street House, then the Decedent would let
Applicant have the J Street House. Applicant Dep., p. 17, lines 5-9.
11.

Applicant thought about the proposal, and the seriousness of the

commitment, and then agreed. Applicant Dep., p. 17, lines 11-21.
12.

At the time Applicant agreed to take care of the Decedent, Applicant had no

information about the expected life-span of the Decedent. Applicant Dep., p. 38, lines 814.
13.

Applicant and his wife performed the following services to help take care of

Decedent: cleaned the house; took care of him; took him to the bathroom; gave him baths;
cooked for him; and took him to his doctor's appointments. Applicant Dep., p. 37, lines 2125, p. 1-3.
14.

In or about April, 2004, the Decedent and the Applicant agreed that the

simplest way to give Applicant the house was to have Sanderson deed it directly to
Applicant. Applicant Dep., p. 39, lines 8-12.
15.

Applicant, in the Decedent's presence, and with the Decedent's approval, told

Sanderson to Quit-Claim the J Street House to him. Sanderson Dep., p. 22, lines 1-8.
16.

Sanderson did so. Sanderson Dep., p. 23, line 10 and Exhibit 1 thereto.

E \Liz\Schwemmer\Summary Judgment Memo wpd
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17.

Shortly thereafter, the Decedent indicated to Sanderson that he did not want

Applicant to have the J Street House. Sanderson Dep., p. 22, lines 9-12, p. 23, lines
10-12.
18.

Sanderson had already Quit-Claimed the J Street House to Applicant.

Sanderson Dep., p. 23, line 10.
19.

Applicant had already recorded the Deed. Sanderson Dep., p. 23, lines

15-16 and Exhibit 1 thereto.
20.

Sanderson testified that sometimes the Decedent was forgetful. Sanderson

Dep., p. 9, lines 8-11.
21.

On or about May 24, 2004, the Decedent Quit-Claimed the 2900 South

House to Contestant. See Quit-Claim Deed from Decedent to Contestant dated May 24,
2004 attached as Exhibit 4 to Evans Aff.
22.

In or about June, 2004, the Decedent was admitted to Good Shepard Home

Care. Deposition of Linda Rawley, dated September 10, 2005 ("Rawley Dep."), p. 5, and
Exhibit 1 thereto (Cited pages and exhibits are attached as Exhibit 5 to Evans Aff.).
23.

Linda Rawley ("Rawley") is a home health and hospice nurse. Rawley Dep.,

p. 4, lines 12-15.
24.

Rawley, the nurse case manager for home health, visited the Decedent at the

J Street House and made assessments of him. Rawley Dep., p. 4, lines 16-20.
25.

During her initial meeting with the Decedent, on June 10,2004, Rawley noted

that the Decedent was not confused. Rawley Dep., p. 47, lines 7-17 and Exhibit 3 thereto.
E:\Uz\Schwemmer\Summary Judgment Memo.wpd
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26.

On that date, to orient the Decedent to her questions and to get an

emergency name for her form, she asked the Decedent who was to get the house he was
living in, the Decedent said his wife. Rawley asked him for her name, but the Decedent
said they were divorced. However, Rawley never asked the Decedent again about his
desires with respect to his estate or regarding a will. Rawley Dep., p. 20, lines 8-19, p. 44,
lines 1-15.
27.

Also in June, 2004, Greg Hatfield ("Hatfield"), the Decedent's physical

therapist, noted in his records that the Decedent was distraught that the Applicant owned
Decedent's home. Hatfield took steps for Adult Protective Services (APS) to be notified.
Deposition of Greg Hatfield, dated September 23,2005, pp. 9-15 (Cited pages and exhibits
are attached as Exhibit 6 to Evans Aff.).
28.

Nevertheless, APS has reported that Applicant has no substantiations in the

APS system. See Evans Aff. at U 8 and Exhibit 7 thereto.
29.

On June 18,2004, Dr. Davis aided the Decedent in filling out a Special Power

of Attorney, Living Will, and Medical Treatment Plan and while doing so, Dr. Davis believed
that the Decedent had the capacity to understand what he was doing. Davis Dep., pp. 14,
16-18, 21-22, and Exhibits 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereto.
30.

The Decedent named Applicant as his agent and attorney in fact under the

Special Power of Attorney. Davis Dep., Exhibit 7.
31.

Applicant has testified that on or about June 29, 2004, the Decedent asked

Applicant to help him fill in a Will Questionnaire, which the Applicant did, with the
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Decedent's help. Applicant Dep., p. 14, lines 12-25, p. 32, lines 18-25, p. 33, lines 1-3,
lines 17-25, p. 34, lines 13-16, and Exhibit 1 thereto.
32.

Applicant testified that he did not force or coerce the Decedent to prepare the

Will Questionnaire. Applicant Dep., p. 34, lines 1-3.
33.

The Will Questionnaire was provided to attorney Michael Lowe ("Lowe").

Deposition of Michael Lowe, dated September 7, 2005 ("Lowe Dep."), pp. 14-15, and
Exhibit 4 thereto (Cited pages and exhibits are attached as Exhibit 8 to Evans Aff.)..
34.

As of Dr. Davis' last examination of the Decedent on July 19, 2004, Dr. Davis

did not believe that the Decedent was susceptible to suggestions. Davis Dep., p. 34, lines
1-10.
35.

Rawley testified, and her notes conform, that on July 26, 2004, the

Decedent's oxygen was at an acceptable level at 90%. Rawley Dep., p. 35, line 25, p. 36,
lines 1-2 and Exhibit 5 thereto.
36.

On or about July 29,2004, Lowe telephoned the Decedent to go over the Will

Questionnaire and to check the Decedent's competency. Lowe Dep., pp. 23-26, lines 1225, and Exhibit 5 thereto.
37.

Lowe determined that the Decedent knew what he owned and who were the

natural objects of his bounty and how he wanted his assets transferred and that he was
competent. Lowe Dep., p. 25, lines 6-12, p. 26, lines 7-11, p. 27, lines 2-9, pp. 31-33, p.
36, lines 8-11 and Exhibit 5 thereto.
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38.

Lowe testified that the Decedent told him that Applicant was taking care of

him, and Applicant was telling him that Applicant wanted Decedent's estate or he would
not drive Decedent to his doctor's appointments. Lowe Dep., p. 24, lines 17-25.
39.

Lowe explained the general power of attorney to Decedent, and Decedent

indicated that he did not want the Applicant to have that power. Lowe Dep. pp. 17-18, lines
19-25, 1-2, p. 24, lines 12-15.
40.

Lowe testified that the Decedent said he wanted one house to go this wife,

one house to go to Applicant, and the rest to go to the LDS church. Lowe made notes of
that on the Will Questionnaire. Lowe Dep., p. 23, lines 19-22 and Exhibit 4 thereto.
41.

Lowe testified that the Decedent said that he wanted one house to go to the

Applicant, but that he did not want the Applicant to get everything. Lowe Dep. p. 26, lines
13-15.
42.

Lowe testified that the Decedent indicated that he was frustrated with

Applicant and the Contestant. Lowe Dep., p. 28, lines 16-18.
43.

Lowe testified that the Decedent was specific with respect to the distribution

of his homes. That he wanted one (the 2900 South House) to go to the Contestant and
one (the J Street House) to go to the Applicant. Lowe Dep. p. 34, lines 3-22, p. 38, lines
7-9, and Exhibit 5 thereto.
44.

Lowe testified that he did not feel as though the Decedent was being

pressured to distribute his property in that way, because when Lowe explained the Will
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Questionnaire, the Decedent indicated the alternative ways of distribution. Lowe Dep. p.
34, lines 23-25, p. 35, lines 1-17.
45.

Lowe also testified that he told the Decedent that he could be causing

problems between Applicant and Contestant, and the Decedent said "they deserve each
other." Lowe Dep., p. 26, lines 18-25.
46.

Lowe testified that the Decedent was clear that he did not want the

Contestant to have both homes. Lowe Dep., p. 39, lines 4-0.
47.

Lowe testified that the Decedent told him that he wanted the Applicant to be

the personal representative of his estate. Lowe Dep., p. 38, lines 9-11.
48.

Applicant was not present during the Decedent's telephone call with Lowe.

Applicant Dep., p. 35, lines 4-6.
49.

The Applicant testified that the Decedent, did however, inform Applicant that

he had had a conversation with Lowe. Applicant Dep., p. 35, lines 7-9.
50.

Lowe prepared the Will for the Decedent (the "Will"). Lowe Dep., p. 5, lines

1-14, and Exhibit 1 thereto.
51.

Lowe testified that the Will conformed to the Decedent's wishes as

communicated to him in accordance with the Will Questionnaire and his telephone
conversation with the Decedent. Lowe Dep., p. 35, lines 22-25, p. 36, lines 1-7, and
Exhibit 4 thereto.
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52.

Rawley testified that on August 2, 2004, the Decedent's oxygen level was at

92% and on August 6, 2004 his oxygen level was 90%. She further testified that those
ranges were fine. Rawley Dep., p. 36, lines 12-18, and Exhibit 5 thereto.
53.

Also on August 6, 2004, Rawley noted that the Decedent had dimentia, but

explained that was because he forgot to take his medication, and that he hadn't changed
his clothes. Rawley Dep., p. 11, lines 6-20, and Exhibit 2 thereto.
54.

Further, Rawley never tested the Decedent for dimentia. Rawley Dep., p. 12,

lines 7-9.
55.

Rawley does not know what the Decedent's oxygen levels were or what his

mental state was from August 7 - 25, 2004. Rawley Dep., p. 40, lines 5-9, p. 52, lines 2025, p. 53, lines 1-4.
56.

The Applicant testified that the Decedent asked Applicant to help him get the

Will executed. Applicant Dep., p. 35, lines 23-25.
57.

The Applicant testified that the Decedent and Applicant read the Will together

before the Decedent signed it. Applicant Dep., p. 36, lines 4-9.
58.

The Applicant testified that he did not exert any improper persuasion upon

Decedent to sign the Will, but rather understood that Decedent was signing the Will as his
free and voluntary act and understood what he was doing. Applicant Dep., p. 37, lines 714, p. 44, lines 10-25, p. 45, lines 1-4.
59.

On August 18, 2004, Decedent executed his Will (the "Will") at the offices of

Utah First Credit Union (the "Credit Union"). See Last Will of Karl Heinz Schwemmer;
E \Liz\Schwemmer\Summary Judgment Memo wpd
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Applicant Dep., p. 26, lines 16-24; Lowe Dep. Exhibit 1; Application for Informal Probate
of A Will and for Appointment of Personal Representative, and Will of Karl Heinz
Schwemmer attached thereto.
60.

Melanie Ballingham ("Ballingham"), an employee of the Credit Union,

witnessed the Decedent's execution of the Will. Deposition of Melanie Ballingham, dated
December 9, 2005 ("Ballingham Dep."), pp. 6-9 (Cited pages and exhibits are attached as
Exhibit 9 to Evans Aff.).
61.

The other witness, Anjanette Peo, another employee of the Credit Union, was

also present when the Decedent signed the Will. Ballingham Dep., p. 9, lines 8-14.
62.

Nothing about the Decedent made Ballingham think there was anything

wrong with him. Ballingham Dep., p. 11, lines 4-5.
63.

When Ballingham was asked if anything in her attestation clause was

incorrect, she said "no." Ballingham Dep., pp. 12-13.
64.

Pursuant to the Will, Decedent disposed of two parcels of real property

owned by him as follows:
I give the following property and all of its contents therein located at
2458 East 2900 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, to my wife, ROSALINDE ELEONOR
SCHWEMMER, if she survives me for thirty (30) days, and if she fails to
survive, this gift shall lapse and be added to the residue of my estate.
Will Fourth Section.
I give the following property and all of its contents therein located at
425 J Street, Salt Lake City, Utah to my brother Fred A Schwemmer, if he
survives me for thirty (30) days, and if he fails to survive, this gift shall lapse
and be added to the residue of my estate.
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See Last Will of Karl Heinz Schwemmer; Applicant Dep., p. 26, lines 16-24; Lowe Dep.
Exhibit 1; Application for Informal Probate of A Will and for Appointment of Personal
Representative, and Will of Karl Heinz Schwemmer attached thereto.
65.

On August 25, 2005, the Decedent was hospitalized and the medical records

from that visit indicate that the Decedent had good recent and remote memory. Davis
Dep., p. 14, 29-30, and Exhibit 6 thereto.
66.

On each and every visit from June 10, 2004 until October 11, 2004, Rawley

indicated that the Decedent was oriented and cooperative. Rawley Dep., p. 47, lines 2125, p. 48, lines 1-23, and Exhibit 5 thereto.
67.

On October 13, 2004, Debbie Low, RN (Tow"), a registered nurse with thirty-

years of experience in performing nursing assessments to determine whether patients are
oriented and alert interviewed the Decedent. Deposition of Debbie Low, RN, dated May
5,2005 ("Low Dep."), pp. 12-16, pp. 30-32, and Exhibit 5 thereto (Cited pages and exhibits
are attached as Exhibit 10 to Evans Aff.).
68.

On that day, Low determined that the Decedent was oriented, forgetful with

respect to his medications (but not forgetful as to people), cognitively aware, and able to
make an informed decision to use his Medicare benefit. Low Dep., pp. 30-34, p. 37, lines
12-25, pp. 38-40, p. 41, lines 1-4, and Exhibits 5, 6, 7, and 8 thereto.
69.

On October 28, 2004, Low again made a record of the Decedent's mental

status. She determined that he was oriented as to person and place. Low testified that
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the Decedent understood what he was being told. Low Dep., pp. 50, lines 10-25, pp. 5152, and Exhibit 10 thereto.
70.

Low testified that she never questioned the Decedent's competency and that

from the time she met him in October, 2004, until the time of his death in December, 2004,
that he understood the decisions that he was making. Low Dep., p. 56, lines 5-19.
71.

Low further testified that there was never any reason to question the

Decedent's competency and that he did not have any trouble remembering recent events.
Low Dep., pp. 63-65.
72.

The Decedent died on December 1, 2004. Low Dep., Exhibit 6 thereto.

73.

On or about December 15, 2004, the Contestant filed a Petition for

Adjudication of Intestacy and Formal Appointment of Personal Representative.

See

Petition for Adjudication of Intestacy and Formal Appointment of Personal Representative,
dated December 15, 2004.
74.

On or about January 18, 2005, the Applicant produced the Will and filed an

Objection to Petition for Adjudication of Intestacy and Informal Appointment of Personal
Representative.

See Objection to Petition for Adjudication of Intestacy and Informal

Appointment of Personal Representative, dated January 18, 2005.
75.

On January 18, 2005, Applicant filed an Application for Informal Probate of

Will and for Appointment of Personal Representative. See Application for Informal Probate
of Will and for Appointment of Personal Representative.
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76

On or about January 25 2005, the Contestant filed her Objection to the

Application for Informal Probate of a Will and for Appointment of a Personal
Representative

See Objection to the Application for Informal Probate of a Will and for

Appointment of a Personal Representative, dated January 25, 2005
III. Argument
The Contestant is unable to present any issues of material fact to defeat the
Applicant's entitlement to judgment as a matter of law "Summary judgment is appropriate
only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law" Smith v Price Dev Co , 2005 UT87, ^ 9

This standard

is met, and therefore, Applicant's Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted
A. Applicant Can Meet His Burden of Proving Proper Execution of the Will
An Applicant bears the initial burden of proving that the Will was properly executed
In re Hansen's Will, 50 Utah 207.167 P 256 (1917), Utah Code Ann § 75-3-407 () Utah
Code Ann 75-2-502(1) provides that a will must be
(a) in writing,
(b) signed by the testator
(c) signed by at least two individuals, each of whom signed within a
reasonable time after he witnessed either the signing of the will as described
in Subsection (1)(b) or the testator's acknowledgment of that signature or
acknowledgment of the will
Further, where there is an attestation clause reciting the statutory requirements for
execution of a will, and the genuineness of the signatures is proved, then a presumption
arises that the recitals are true and the Will was duly executed In re Thurman's Estate,
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369 P.2d 925, 926, 13 Utah 2d 156 (1962); In re Buttars' Estate, 123 Utah 596, 261 P.2d
171, 172 (1953) . "The presumption of due execution of a Will is of such strength that it
will support a finding to that effect; and it can be overcome only by clear and convincing
evidence." Thurman, 369 P.2d at 926. As set forth in the foregoing Statement of Facts,
Applicant has met this burden. See also Will.
B. Contestant Cannot Prove that the Decedent was Incompetent
The Contestant cannot establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
Decedent was incompetent to make a will. A testator is presumed competent to make a
will. In re Estate of Kesler, 702 P.2d 86, 88 (Utah 1985). A contestant bears the burden
of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the testator was not of a sound and
disposing mind at the time he made the will, id/, In re Buttars Estate. 261 P.2d 171, 172
(Utah 1953). A preponderance of the evidence means evidence that is of a greater weight.
Wiahtman v. Mountain Fuel Supply, Co., 302 P.2d 471, 473, n.5, 5 Utah 2d 373 (1956).
The test for determining if a person is competent to execute a will is whether at the time
the will is made, the person had sufficient mental capacity to be able (1) to identify the
natural objects of the person's bounty and recognize that person's relationship to them, (2)
to recall the nature and extent of the person's property, and (3) to formulate a plan for
disposing of the person's property in an understandable manner. Kesler, 702 P.2d at 88.
The mere fact that a person might be forgetful at times does not prove that they lack
testamentary capacity. Buttars, 261 P.2dat602. Contestant cannot meet her burden to
show that the Decedent was incompetent.
E:\Liz\Schwemmer\Summary Judgment Memo wpd

IO

Lowe, the Decedent's lawyer and scrivener of the Will, testified that the Decedent
knew what property he had, knew who were the natural objects of his bounty, and knew
what he wanted to do with his property

See Statement of Fact Mo 37

In fact the

Decedent was able to communicate changes that he wanted made from the Will
Questionnaire

See Statement of Facts Nos 39-41, 44

The Decedent's health care

workers found that, both before and after the preparation and execution of the Will,
Decedent was oriented and alert and competent to make decisions
Facts Nos 34, 35, 42, 53, 65-71

See Statement of

Rawley further testified that around the time that the

Decedent was making his plans and talking to his attorney regarding his will that the his
oxygen levels were in an acceptable range

Statement of Facts Nos 35, 52

The

Decedent's primary care physician testified that the Decedent did not suffer any mental
impairment, and was not susceptible to influence by others See Statement of Facts No
34
The only evidence that the Contestant has to offer is that in June, 2004, prior to
ratification of his actions in the Will, that 1) in or about June, 2004, the Decedent indicated
that he changed his mind about giving the Applicant his home, and 2) the testimony of an
acquaintance, not a medical professional, who said that sometimes the Decedent was
forgetful

See Statement of Fact Nos 1 7-20

Changing one's mind is not evidence of

competency and testimony of being forgetful or eccentric is legally insufficient to establish
incompetency

Buttars, 261 P 2d at 174 All of the evidence prior to, during and after
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execution of the Will is of such great weight to support the presumption that the Decedent
was competent to make a Will. See Statement of Facts and Buttars.
C. Contestant Cannot Meet Her Burden to Prove That The Decedent
Executed the Will as a Result of Undue Influence or Duress
The Contestant cannot prove by clear and convincing evidence that the Decedent
executed his Will as a result of undue influence or duress.
To declare a will invalid because of undue influence, there must be an
exhibition of more than influence or suggestion, there must be substantial
proof of an overpowering of the testator's volition at the time the will was
made, to the extent he is impelled to do that which h0 would not have done
had he been free from such controlling influence, so that the will represents
the desire of the person exercising the influence rather than that of the
testator.
In re Lavelle's Estate v. First Security Bank of Utah, 248 P.2d 372, 375-76, 122 Utah 253
(1952) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Such a burden must be met with proof
of clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., Russell v. Russell, 852 P.2d 997, 999 and n.
2 (Utah 1993). See also MUJI 23.2 and comments thereto. For evidence to be clear and
convincing, it must at least have reached the point where there remains no substantial
doubt as to the truth or correctness of the conclusion based upon the evidence. Jardine
v. Archibald, 279 P.2d 454, 457, 3 Utah 2d 88 (1955). Contestant cannot meet this
burden.
Contestant's only evidence of undue influence or duress are alleged statements
made by Decedent in or about June, 2004, prior to Decedent's conversation with counsel
and prior to his execution of the Will, that he did not want the Applicant to have the J Street
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House. See Statement of Facts Nos. 17, 26, 27. However, despite reports to APS, no
substantiation was made against Applicant. See Statement of Fact No. 28. In addition,
the Decedent himself, ratified the decision to give the Applicant the J Street House in his
Will and in conversation with Lowe, his attorney. See Statement of Facts Nos. 37-46, 51,
57, 59, 64. The only other evidence is the Decedent's statements to his attorney, that he
was frustrated with the Applicant, and that possibly the Applicant was trying to take his
estate and threatening not to take him to his doctor's appointments. See Statement of
Facts Nos. 38, 42.

Nevertheless, even with that said, the Decedent was able to

communicate to his attorney limits to be put on the Applicant, such that the Applicant was
not to be given a general power of attorney, and that the residue of his estate was to got
to the LDS Church and not the Applicant. See Statement of Facts Nos. 40, 44, and Will.
That evidence suggests that while the Decedent may have sensed some overreaching on
the Applicant's part he was able to make his own decisions and determine what to do with
his property. The Contestant is unable to prove the overpowering of the Decedent's
volition to sustain her claim of undue influence or duress. See, e.g., Monies Family v.
Carter, 878 P.2d 1168, 1174 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Therefore, the Constestant's claims for
undue influence and duress in initially transferring the property, and making the Will, must
be dismissed.
IV. Conclusion
Applicant is able to establish his prima facie case that the Decedent's Will was
properly executed.

There is, therefore, a strong presumption for the Contestant to
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overcome. The Constestant cannot overcome the presumption. The Contestant seeks to
establish that the Decedent was incompetent to make a Will. However, Contestant's only
evidence is too remote in time and is limited to some forgetfulness on the part of the
Decedent. That is not sufficient. To the contrary, the majority of the evidence from
medical and legal professionals establishes thatthe Decedent was competent. In addition,
the Contestant seeks to establish that the Decedent transferred property and executed his
Will as a result of undue influence and duress. The Contestant must prove her claims by
clear and convincing evidence. Again, she cannot meet this burden. The only evidence
that the Contestant can claim sustains her position is the testimony of the Decedent's
attorney who said that the Decedent indicated that the Applicant was trying to take control
of the Decedent's estate. Nevertheless, the Decedent's attorney determined that in spite
of the Applicant's apparent overreaching, the Decedent was able to determine his own
estate plan and deviate from the Applicant's wishes. Further, there is no evidence to
support the Contestant's claim that the Applicant should not be named as the personal
representative in accordance with the Will. The Contestant has no other proof to help her
meet her burden. Consequently, the Contestant's claims should be dismissed and the
Applicant's Motion for Summary Judgment should be granteld.
DATED this ±_ day of January, 2006.

/

DENNIS K. POOLE
ELIZABETH M. EVANS
POOLE & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
APPLICANT FRED SCHWEMMER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, was sent
by United States Mail, postage prepaid, the . "> day of January, 2006, to the following
David A McPhie, Esq
2105 E Murray-Holladay Road
Holladay, Utah 84117
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ADDENDUM 4

>:;t.i

DENNIS K. POOLE
(2625)
ELIZABETH EVANS
(7256)
POOLE & ASSOCIATES, L.C.
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801)263-3344
Telecopier: (801)263-1010
Attorneys for Applicant
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, PROBATE DIVISION
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE
OF:
KARL HEINZ SCHWEMMER
DOB: June 9, 1928

AFFIDAVIT OF FRED SCHWEMMER
PROBATE NO. 043902075
JUDGE KATE TOOMEY

Deceased.

STATE OF UTAH

)

: ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
FRED SCHWEMMER, having been duly sworn under oath, hereby deposes and
states as follows:
1.

My name is Fred Schwemmer, and I am a resident of Salt Lake County.

2.

I am the title owner of the home located at 425 J Street in Salt Lake City,

Utah (the "House"), which house my brother, Karl Heinz Schwemmer, the Deceased,
repurchased from Gregg Sanderson, then caused Gregg Sanderson to deed to me on
March 12, 2006 for certain care and services which my wife and I provided to him and
E \Liz\Schwemmer\Fred affidavit wpd

were provided for him, including cleaning his house, helping him to the bathroom, bathing
him, cooking for him, and taking him to doctors' appointments. All such services were
performed for him until his death.
3.

I do not live in the House, and the House is unoccupied.

4.

I am now 72 years old, and maintaining the House is very difficult for me. It

is costly and burdensome to pay others to maintain it.
5.

It is also very costly and burdensome to continue to hold the House in that

I have been required to pay real property taxes and insurance. I am forced to pay other
costs such as utilities for the House.
6.

I do not want to rent the house, because the lease would be unusually short

as I anticipate selling the House as soon as possible. Furthermore, the wear and tear
caused by renters would add work and expense to the process of readying the House for
a purchaser.
7.

Selling the House would relieve a great burden from me and allow me to

recoup some of the costs and expenses which I have incurred by heretofore being
precluded by this litigation from selling the House.
DATED this

^ ' day of September, 2007.

»

<~ <)Ui

(AC % *'»£'/??'•*•*'

FRED SCHWEMMER
ACKNOWLEDGED before me this

-

day of September, 2007, by FRED

SCHWEMMER.
^/ftif

'

A y - ' ' --

"NOTARY PUBLIC
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of AFFIDAVIT OF FRED
SCHWEMMER, was sent by United States Mail, postage prepaid, the 2^

day of

September, 2007, to the following:
David A. McPhie, Esq.
2105 E. IMurray-Holladay Road
_ ^
Holladay .Utah 84117
• *

-

—

—

^

\
^____^^
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ADDENDUM 5
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DAVID A. McPHIE (2216)
Attorney at Law
2105 E. Murray-Holladay Rd.
Holladay, Utah84117
(801)278-3700

GARY

Uxl -

CUT

RECORDER, SALT LAKE COUNTY,
DAVID A MCPHIE
2105 E HURRAY HOLLADAY RD
HOLLADAY UT 841J 7
BY: 3BM, DEPUTY - MA 2 P.

Attorney for Petitioner
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—ooOoo—

KARL HETNZ SCHWEMMER,

NOTICE OF PENDING LITIGATION
(LIS PENDENS)

DOB June 9th, 1928

Deceased.

Probate No. 043902075
—ooOoo—

1
2
3
4

COMES NOW, Rosalinde Schwemmer, the Petitioner in the above captioned matter, by
and through her attorney of record, David A. McPhie, and give notice of the following:
1.

Rosalinde Schwemmer is the Petitioner in a probate action currently pending in

the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

5

3.

The probate number of that action is 043902075.

6

4.

As part of that action, Rosalinde Schwemmer, the Petitioner therein, claim legal

7

and equitable interests in the real estate which is located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah,

8

bearing the following legal description:

9

COMMENCING AT POINT 2 1 /2 RODS NORTH OF THE SOUTHEAST

David A.
McPhie
Attorney
At Low

BK 9077 PG 6527

mm

1

CORNER OF LOT 4, BLOCK 117, PLAT "D", SALT LAKE CITY SURVEY,

2

AND RUNNING THENCE NORTH 2 1/2 RODS; THENCE WEST 5 RODS,

3

THENCE SOUTH 2 1/2 RODS, THENCE EAST 5 RODS TO THE PLACE OF

4

BEGINNING.

5

Parcel No 09-32-156-014

6

Also known as:

7

5.

8
9
10
11

425 J Street, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah

The nature and the extent of the Petitioner's legal and equitable interests in this

real estate, are the subject of pending litigation in the case referred to immediately above.
6.

This Notice of Pending Litigation is provided to notify all persons of the

Petitioner's claims, and the pending litigation.
DATED this _^£f£ay of

12
13
14

/«C<^

/.

h

2004.

>

&

#

•

David A. McPhie
Attorney for Plaintiff
ACKNOWLEDGMENT

15
16
17
18

STATE OF UTAH

19
20
21

On this 3&* day of t X ^ W l W ' " "
in the year 2004, before me David A.
McPhie, known to me to be the person who executed the within Notice of Pending Litigation
(Lis Pendens) and acknowledged to me that he executed the same for the purposes therein stated.

22
23
24

My Commission Expires:
(MM (4,7/gHI

25

c \CUD(/TS\SGJAWEM!VIER\LIS-PEND J

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
:ss.
)

NOTARY PUBLIC, Raiding at
Salt Lake County, Utah
CZ3 CZ=3 C2p C O I

David A.
McPhie
Attorney
At Law

NotaryPutfto

J

SALLYJ.HUTCHIR6S •
2105 East MuTrBy44ota(fcyRgi4|
Holladay, Utah 84117
m
My Commission Expto*
I
July t9,2007
I
State of Utah

<=) c=> cz3 c=n a=3 i

ADDENDUM 6

DAVID A. McPHIE (2216)
Attorney at Law
2105 E. Murray-Holladay Rd.
Holladay,Utah84117
(801)278-3700
Attorney for Petitioner Rosalinde Schwemmer
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR

"t "-s
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF:
KARL HEINZ SCHWEMMER,

\

—ooOoo—
WIDOW'S OBJECTION TO THE
MOTION FOR AUTHORITY TO
SELL PROPERTY

DOB June 9th, 1928,
Deceased.

Probate No. 043902075
Judge Lewis
—ooOoo—

1

COMES NOW Rosalinde Schwemmer, the widow of the Decedent Karl Heinz

2

Schwemmer, and obiects to the Applicant's Motion Seeking Authority to sell the home located at

3

425 J Street in Salt Lake City, Utah.

4
5
6

This Objection is supported by a Memorandum in Support of this Objection filed
contemporaneously herewith.
WHEREFORE, Rosalinde Schwemmer prays that the Motion will be denied.

1

DATED this

$*"

day of

, 2006.

)X^^«t^

2
3
4

David A. McPhie
Attorney for Petitioner

5

MAILING CERTIFICATE

6
7
8

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Widow's Objection
to the Motion for Authority to Sell Property to the following, postage prepaid this £ «^ Day of
^C^^UV\
, 2006:

9
10
11
12
13

Dennis K. Poole
Elizabeth Evans
POOLE & ASSOCIATES
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107

14

^SkMjA^t^

15

16

avid A.
icPhie
Homey
t Law

)rt^RAJ&<M

Sally Hatchings

C \CLIENTS\SCI I\VEMMER\OB I-SELL PROP

ADDENDUM 6

DAVID A. McPHIE (2216)
Attorney at Law
2105 E. Murray-Holladay Rd.
Holladay,Utah84117
(801)278-3700

CD
Cr-\

rn

Attorney for Petitioner Rosalinde Schwemmer
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR*
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—ooOoo—

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF:
KARL HEINZ SCHWEMMER,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF THE OBJECTION TO THE
MOTION TO SELL PROPERTY

DOB June 9th, 1928,
Deceased.

Probate No. 043902075
Judge Lewis
—ooOoo-

1
2

Schwemmer's Application to sell the home located at 425 J Street in Salt Lake City, Utah. Her

3

reasons for objecting are as follows.

4

avid A.
IcPhie
ttomev
I Law

THE WIDOW of the Decedent, Rosalinde Schwemmer, has objected to Fred

1.

The Applicant Fred Schwemmer indicates that he has received an offer from an

5

unrelated third party to purchase the J Street house for $274,000.00, and offers a copy of the Real

6

Estate Purchase Contract as an Exhibit to his motion to prove that he has the offer. Rosalinde

7

Schwemmer does not doubt the offer, but asserts that the offer is evidence that the house is

8

increasing in value at a substantial rate. The deposition of Gregg Sanderson, a person who was

1

interested in purchasing the home was taken on March 30th, 2005. In said deposition, Mr.

2

Sanderson stated that in June of 1999,' he made a deal with Karl Heinz Schwemmer, the

3

Decedent, to purchase the home for the amount of $132,000.00.2 The argument that the home is

4

declining in value is simply not true. If the offer referred to in fact reflects the value of the home,

5

it has more than doubled in value since June of 1999.

6

2.

There is a substantial body of evidence that Fred Schwemmer coerced his brother

7

to extract from him, while under duress, the Deed which he holds, and also coerced him while

8

under duress to then name him in his Will. The evidence of coercion and duress are as follows.

9

A.

Gregg Sanderson, the man who actually deeded the house to Fred

10

Schwemmer, said in his deposition^ that:

11

i.

Pg 21 line 2 to Pg 23 line 11: Gregg met with Karl and Fred. Karl

12

just had his teeth pulled for dentures and was on some serious

13

medication. Fred said Karl agreed to give the house to him. Karl

14

nodded. Then when feeling better (a few days later), Karl said he

15

didn't want Fred to have the house. Fred was pushing to get the

16

transfer done.

17

ii.

18

Pg 43 lines 15-24: Karl was noticeably on pain medication at the
time Fred said Karl wanted to deed the house to him.

i

See Exhibit A attached hereto.
See the deposition of Gregg Sanderson taken March 30th, 2005, page 4 line 23.
See the deposition pages of Gregg Sanderson attached hereto as Exhibit B.

id A.
Phie

2

iii.

Pg 46 line 23 to pg 48 line 14: Karl fell Fred Conned him into
getting the house.

iv.

Pg 51 lines 1-10: Karl didn't want the house to go to Fred.

Karl Schwemnier confided in some of his health care workers.
Specifically, Karl Schwemnier told his physical therapist Greg Hatfield on
June 21st, 2004, after the Deed was given to Fred Schwemnier, but before
Karl signed the Will, that he had just learned that somehow his brother
Fred got legal control of his house, and that he didn't want Fred to have
control of his house, and he didn't know how Fred had gotten control of
his house. Greg Hatfield, the physical therapist, reported that Karl
Schwemnier was upset that his brother Fred had gotten control of his
home. So upset and distraught that he had difficultly focusing on his
therapy and spent the entire physical therapy session explaining that he did
not know how the Deed to his house could have gotten in his brother's
name. Greg Hatfield was so concerned, he referred the matter to Social
Services for an elder abuse investigation at Karl Schwemnier's request and
urging. Social Services never investigated. (Deposition of Greg Hatfield
page 9 line 3 through page 10 line 21, page 12 line 6 though 24, page 13
line 16 through 21, page 14 line 10 through page 15 line 4, and page 26
lines 4 though 22.)
Karl Schwemnier also told the witness Michael Lowe, who was the

3

1

attorney commissioned by his brother, Fred, to produce a Will for him that

2

Fred was trying to get control of things, that Fred was trying to get a

3

Power of Attorney to give him control over Karl. Karl Schwemmer told

4

Michael Lowe, the Will preparer, "'If Fred calls, don't speak to him, he's

5

trying to take the estate." The Decedent Karl Schwemmer further told the

6

Will preparer that "Fred was taking care of him and was helping him, and

7

was telling him he wanted his estate or he would not drive him to his

8

doctor appointments." Karl told the Will preparer that he was "being

9

pressured by Fred." (Deposition of Michael Lowe page 21 line 15 through

10
11

page 22 line 24, and page 24 line 3 through page 25 line 5.)
3.

Although Fred Schwemmer is the current record title owner of the J Street house,

12

Rosalinde Schwemmer has filed a Quiet Title Action to set aside that real estate transfer. A copy

13

of her Quiet Title Action Complaint is attached to this Memorandum as Exhibit C. This

14

evidence is not presented to try and prove the case, but to indicate to the Court that Rosalinde

15

Schwemmer's claims in both this probate case and in the Quiet Title Action are not without

16

substance.

17
18
19

4.

The property located at 425 J Street in Salt Lake City, Utah, is a unique property.

Its value is not what Rosalinde Schwemmer wants, it is tlie property itself.
5.

The home located at 425 J Street was a marital asset the day Karl Heinz

20

Schwemmer died, was purchased with marital assets, and an item on which Rosalinde

21

Schwemmer would have had an equitable claim in a divorce action. It was purchased with the

4

1

proceeds of a prior home which was sold, which had been titled in both parties' names.

2

There has been no evidence produced for the Court that it is in the best interest of

3

the parties to sell this real estate. The home is currently unoccupied. However, this is to the

4

shame of Mr. Fred Schwemmer. The home has rental value, and yet Fred Schweninger has

5

chosen not to rent it for the last year. When asked at deposition why he did not rent the house, he

6

said:

7
8

"Because I had rental problems before and 1 had bad experience with renters."
(December 12th, 2005 Deposition of Fred Schwemmer. Page 11 line 25 through

9

page 12 line 1.)

10

7.

Fred Schwemmer indicates in his motion that the house requires maintenance that

11

is difficult for the Applicant, age 71, to perform, but he doesn't indicate what maintenance and

12

why it is difficult. When he was asked about what kinds of work he had done on the house in the

13

past, Fred Schwemmer's answer was that since, he has done the following:

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

avid A.
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6.

"Gregg Sanderson, when he worked on the house he didn't fix the roof on the
add-on room so I had to fix the whole roof and fascia and that room. And I put
some new concrete steps in it. I painted the outside and I painted — touched up
the paint inside. I did some plumbing for the backyard. 1 fixed a sprinkling
system. There's several more things. These are the things that I can remember
right now, I made a list of." (December 12th, 2005 Deposition of Fred
Schwemmer. Page 24 line 25 through page 25 line 9.)
Clearly, the man has the ability to perform the maintenance. If he was willing to rent the

22

house, he could easily pay for the maintenance with the rent, and be building the value of the

23

estate. Applicant argues that selling the J Street house will prevent waste to the property.

24

However, when asked at deposition whether there had been vandalism or waste, Mr. Schwemmer

25

could not identify any. In fact, he stated:

1
2
4
5
6
7
8
9
0

Is it locked up?"
It's locked."
Has it had any vandalism?"
No."
When is the last time you checked it?"
A week ago."
"0- Does it need any work done?"
"A.
No, I took care of it."
(December 12lh, 2005 Deposition of Fred Schwemmer. Page 12 line 2 through
line 9.)

11

Rosalinde Schwemmer will not benefit by having the property sold. She would benefit

12

"Q.
"A.
"Q.
"A.
"Q.
"A.

by having the property itself

13

WHEREFORE, the Petitioner Rosalinde Schwemmer, the widow of the Decedent, prays

14

that the Court will deny said motion, and preserve this unique property until the probate and quiet

15

title actions can be resolved.

16

DATED this

17
18
19

2* day of

J

?5Sgfr'MW

*^Jdr*

, 2006.

&

David A. McPhie
Attorney for Petitioner Rosalinde Schwemmer

6

1

MAILING CERTIFICATE

2
3

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the ibregoing Memorandum to the
following, postage prepaid this jttK Day of H^WO/M
, 2006:

4
5
6
7
8

Dennis K. Poole
Elizabeth Evans
POOLE & ASSOCIATES
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107

9
10

1 1

invid A.
IcPhie
Homey
I Law
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ADDENDUM 7

2,

en

DAVID A McPHIE (2216)
Attorney at Law
2105 E Murray-Holladay Rd
Holladay, Utah 84117
(801) 278-3700

\

i^

/£-*.

Attorney for Suzette Ruseler

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
-ooOoo—

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF:
KARL HEINZ SCHWEMMER,

OBJECTION TO APPLICANT'S
MOTION FOR AUTHORITY
TO SELL PROPERTY

DOB June 9th, 1928,
Deceased.

Probate No 043902075
Judge Toomey
—ooOoo—

1
2

and without admitting or claiming an appointment as the Personal Representative or Special

3

Administrator of the estate of Rosalinde Schwemmer, objects to the Motion for Authority to Sell

4

the J Street Property

5

6

David A.
McPhie
Attorney
At Law

COMES NOW Suzette Ruseler, by and through her attorney of record, David McPhie,

Grounds for this objection are both procedural and substantive.

PROCEDURAL OBJECTIONS

1

1.

This Court has ordered that either Suzette Ruseler accept an appointment to

2

represent the claims of Rosalinde Schwemmer against Fr$d Schwemmer, or accept a consequence

3

should she fail to do so. The consequence for Suzette failing to accept is that the claims of

4

Rosalinde Schwemmer against Fred Schwemmer would be dismissed.

5

2.

Because Suzette Ruseler did not want to $ee the claims of Rosalinde Schwemmer

6

dismissed, she, under protest, accepted the appointment. She has subsequently filed a motion

7

with this Court for a stay in these proceedings, and an Interlocutory Appeal, or in the alternative,

8

a Motion for Emergency Relief with the Supreme Court. The matter has been assigned to the

9

Court of Appeals.

10

3.

This Court's appointment of Suzette Ruseler was limited. This Court did not

11

determine, because it could not, that Suzette Ruseler will be appointed Rosalinde Schwemmer5s

12

Personal Representative. This Court did not, because it could not. determine that Suzette Ruseler

13

should be appointed as a Special Administrator for emergency purposes to represent Rosalinde

14

Schwemmer. Only the probate judge assigned to Rosalinde's case can do either of those things.

15

4.

Counsel for Fred Schwemmer has filed a motion asking the Court to allow Fred to

16

sell the J Street property, and sends a copy to Suzette Ruseler because she is the only other

17

person in this case, but her appointment by this Court is limited. It is limited to litigating the

18

claims of Rosalinde Schwemmer only. Suzette does not have the authority from this Court or

19

from any other court to agree to dispose of an asset. Only the Personal Representative of

20

Rosalinde's estate or a Special Administrator assigned by the Probate Judge in Rosalinde's case

21

would have that authority.

2

1

5.

This is a serious procedural problem. The proper procedure for Fred would be to

2

apply to the District Court in Rosalinde Schwemmer's probate case and ask the Judge to appoint

3

a Special Administrator on an emergency basis under Sections 75-3-614, 615, and 616 U.C.A. for

4

authority to handle these matters which are emerging and require attention before the proper

5

Personal Representative can be determined.

6

6.

Such an appointment would give the person appointed both the legal power and

7

authority to make decisions concerning the estate of Rosalinde Schwemmer, i.e. to agree to, or

8

oppose the motion, and would allow them to be paid with estate funds to do so. Suzette Ruseler

9

does not enjoy either position.

10

11

SUBSTANTIVE

7.

Fred Schwemmer first asked this Court for permission to sell the J Street house on

12

January 25th, 2006, approximately 21 months ago, when Judge Leslie Lewis was assigned the

13

case. In support of that motion, he filed a Memorandum with exhibits. His position then was

14

essentially the same as it is now, which was that he doesn't like waiting for resolution of this case,

15

and he is required to pay the property taxes annually and insurance premiums in the meantime.

16
17
18
19

8.

The only difference between Fred Schwemmer's position in January of 2006 and

his position now, is that we are closer to resolving the case now. He has less time to wait.
9.

After receiving Fred's original motion for leave to sell the J Street property, the

objection to the motion, a reply to the objection, and a rejoinder to the reply, Judge Lewis in her

>avid A.
IcPhie
ttomey
tLaw

J

1

decision dated March 30th, 2006, denied the motion stating that:

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

"After considering the parties' respective legal positions, the Court determines that
the J Street house should not be sold until it is determined who is the rightful
owner of the house. In the meantime. Mr. Schwemmer has options, i.e.. he can
alleviate his difficulty in maintaining the house by hiring a maintenance company.
using the rental income from the house. Further, since it appears that the house
continues to appreciate in value, Mr. Schwemmer will suffer no prejudice in
forestalling the sale pending a resolution of the ownership issue. Therefore, the
Court denies Mr. Schwemmer's Motion for Authority to Sell Property." [Emphasis
added]

11

10.

Nothing has changed. He could hire a maintenance company and rental agency to

12

manage and maintain the property and pay them. The rents would also cover the taxes and

13

insurance.

14

11.

There has been no evidence produced for the Court that it is in the best interest of

15

all parties to sell this real estate. The home is currently unoccupied. However, this is the decision

16

of Mr. Fred Schwemmer. The home has rental value, and yet Fred Schwemmer has chosen not to

17

rent it.1

18

12.

Fred Schwemmer indicates in his motion that the house requires maintenance that

19

is difficult for the Applicant, age 71, to perform, but he doesn't indicate what maintenance and

20

why it is now difficult.

21
22
23
24
25

13.

Fred did some maintenance on the house since this litigation started. In his

deposition dated December 12, 2005, Fred Stated,
"I had to fix the whole roof and fascia and that room. And I put some new
concrete steps in it. I painted the outside and I painted — touched up the paint
inside. I did some plumbing for the backyard. I fixed a sprinkling system. There's

deposition of Fred Schwemmer taken December 12, 2005, page 11, line 25 through page 12, line 1 (Exhibit A).
rid A.
Phie
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4

1

several more things. These are the things that I can remember right now, I made a

2

list of."2

3

14.

4

rent the house, he could also easily pay for the maintenance if he doesn't want to do it personally

5

any more.

6

15.

Applicant argues that selling the J Street house will prevent waste to the property.

7

However, when asked at deposition whether there had been vandalism or waste, Mr. Schwemmer

8

could not identify any. In fact, he stated:

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

"Q.
Is it locked up?"
"A.
It's locked."
"Q
Has it had any vandalism?"
"A.
No."
"Q
When is the last time you checked it?"
A week ago."
"A.
Does it need any work done?"
"Q
No, I took care of it."
"A.
(December 12th, 2005 Deposition of Fred Schwemmer. Page 12 line 2 through
line 9.)

19
20

16.

This Court is not bound by Judge Lewis' prior Order, but Fred's motion then and

now is without merit.

21

17.

In his original request for sale, Fred Schwemmer said that he had received an offer

22

from an unrelated third party to purchase the J Street house for $274,000.00. Rosalinde

23

Schwemmer did not then doubt the offer, but asserted that the offer was evidence that the house

24

was increasing in value at a substantial rate. The deposition of Gregg Sanderson, a person who

2

avid A.
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Clearly, the man has the ability to perform the maintenance. If he was willing to

See page 24, line 24 though page 25, line 9 (Exhibit A).

1

was interested in purchasing the home was taken on March 30th, 2005. Mr. Sanderson stated

2

that in June of 1999,3 he made a deal with Karl Heinz Schwemmer to purchase the home for the

3

amount of $132,000.00.4 The argument that the home is declining in value is simply not true.

4

The J Street property has more than doubled in value since June of 1999.

5
6

18.

The estate of Rosalinde Schwemmer will not benefit by having the property sold.

It would benefit by having the property itself.

7

19.

The property located at 425 J Street in Salt Lake City, Utah, is a unique property.

8

Because it is unknown who will be Rosalinde's Personal Representative or who will receive her

9

estate, Suzette Ruseler cannot speak for them.

10

20.

Fred's request to be reimbursed from the sale proceeds for taxes and insurance is

11

preposterous. He is the current legal owner of the property. As per Utah law, barring a

12

contracted agreement that somebody else pay the taxes, Fred is responsible for them. If he

13

doesn't want to insure the property, it is his choice. There is no mortgage company requiring

14

insurance.

15

21.

Fred's request that the property be sold so that he can be reimbursed is out of

16

order. First the property should be sold. Fred's argument anticipates his defeat. If he is

17

victorious in this litigation, he doesn't need reimbursement. Even if it was sold, it would be

18

inappropriate to reimburse anybody until the issues in this suit are ultimately decided.

19

3

See the deposition of Gregg Sanderson taken March 30th, 2005, page 4 line 23 (Exhibit B).
See the deposition of Gregg Sanderson taken March 30th, 2005, page 4 line 23 (Exhibit B).

6

1
2

3

WHEREFORE, Suzette Ruseler objects to the Motion for Authority to Sell the J Street
Property.

Respectfully submitted, this

/

5

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Objection to the
following, postage prepaid this 1 ^ Day of D^\P^T
, 2007:
Dennis K. Poole
POOLE & ASSOCIATES
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107

13
14

15

ivid A.
cPhie
f
orney
Law

, 2007.

David A. McPhie, Attorney for Suzette Ruseler

6
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7
8

day of

Sally tiutchings
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